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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of the April allowance submissions mandate under the 
European Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS) in carbon emission markets. Using 
intraday order flow data, we test for the cross-market efficiency of spot-futures 
dynamics and find that the equilibrium level, adjustment speed and no-arbitrage 
boundaries of the spot and futures relationship shift subsequent to the submission date. 
In addition, our results show that the allowance submissions affect the price discovery 
process, with the carbon spot market providing stronger price leadership in the periods 
before the submission date and the futures market playing the predominant 
informational role thereafter. Using the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility 
(HAR-RV) model, we also find a change in volatility spillovers before the submission 
date, particularly from the spot to the futures market. Overall, the results suggest that 
the April allowance submissions have significant impact on the time series dynamics of 
spot and futures carbon emission markets.   
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1. Introduction  
Carbon emission markets, which are designed to reduce emissions of global 
greenhouse gases (GHG), have experienced rapid ongoing development even during the 
recent recession and have attracted considerable attention from policy makers and 
investors. The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), accounting for 
around 84% of the total value of the global carbon market, is the most influential and 
successful emission trading market in the world (World Bank, 2012). By March 31 of 
each year, operating firms report information about their realized emissions from the 
preceding year, and subsequently the aggregate figures on the emissions realized are 
announced by the European Commission. Under the EU ETS, by April 30, operating 
firms are required to surrender sufficient carbon allowances to cover their annual 
emissions.  
Firms with spare allowances have the incentive to sell their allowances on the 
exchange for cash before the submission date. On the other hand, firms that emit more 
than their allotted allowance will want to buy allowances from firms with spares before 
the submission date to avoid the heavy penalty. This would mean that the trading 
activities in the spot and futures emission market should be pronounced during the 
period before the submission date, as compared with periods thereafter. Moreover, since 
the surrendered carbon allowances are no long available to trade, the inventory level of 
allowances in the market decreases significantly as we near the April submission date 
each year. The changes in the inventory levels influence the costs and constraints of 
arbitrage. Lower inventory levels after allowance submissions will increase the 
inventory risk and widen the bid-ask spread, affecting trading behavior. Market makers 
require additional compensation for inventory risk (Ho and Stoll, 1981; Biais, 1993). In 
addition, it is harder for market makers to conduct short-selling activities when 
inventory levels are lower. Hence, the allowance submissions mandate in April can alter 
the price dynamics in the European carbon spot and futures markets. 
Previous evidence for abnormal price changes, increase in volume and volatilities in 
the futures contracts around the European Commission announcement date of aggregate 
realized emissions has been documented by recent studies such as Grüll and Kiesel 
(2012) and Hitzemann, Uhrig-Homburg and Ehrhart (2013). However, unlike previous 
studies, this paper is the first to analyze the changes in the trading behavior and the joint 
price dynamics underlying the carbon spot and futures markets, before and after the 
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allowance submissions mandate of April 30. First, we test whether there is a change in 
the mispricing relationship of the spot and futures markets; that is, we test for changes 
in the equilibrium level, mean-reverting speed, and no-arbitrage bands of the carbon 
spot and futures relationship before and after the submission date. The results obtained 
are important in understanding the arbitrage activities in the European carbon emission 
markets at market microstructure level. Second, we investigate whether allowance 
submissions influence the information transmission between spot and futures carbon 
markets. It is possible that the spot market responds to new information more quickly 
than the futures market before the submission date due to the active trading in the spot 
market. Therefore, we test for changes in the short-run price discovery process using 
Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969), and also examine for changes in the dynamics 
of the volatility transmission process before and after the submission date. In particular, 
we use the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility (HAR-RV) model of Corsi 
(2009) for testing changes in the volatility spillover process between the spot and 
futures markets. For the empirical analysis, we use the intraday Phase II transactions 
data on the EU ETS from 2009 to 2011.  
The empirical results show that the mispricing relationship underlying the spot and 
futures markets differs significantly before and after the allowance submission date. In 
particular, we observe a change in the long-run equilibrium level, the speed of 
adjustment, and the upper and lower bands of the no-arbitrage area after the allowance 
submission date. The above effects are prominent in 2009 and 2011, but not in 2010. 
This disparity is primarily driven by the broader market movements observed in the 
emissions market over these years (explained below). In terms of the information 
transmission process, the results of Granger causality tests reveal that, although in line 
with Rittler (2012) there is bidirectional information transmission between carbon spot 
and futures returns, the spot market leads (or Granger-causes) the futures market much 
more in the periods before the allowance submission date, while the futures market 
leads (or Granger-causes) the spot market much more after the submission date. Further, 
for the volatility transmission process, the results of the bivariate HAR-RV model show 
that the volatility spillovers between spot and futures markets significantly differ before 
and after the submission date. More specifically, we find that volatility spillovers from 
the futures market to the spot market are only significant in the periods after the 
submission date. Before the allowance submission date, the price discovery happens in 
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the spot market, with informational spillovers in the volatility from the spot to the 
futures market. This is driven by the fact that the buying and selling of carbon 
allowances is much more pronounced in the spot market before the submission date as 
part of unwinding hedge positions and rebalancing books. Hence any new information 
revealed in the market will be first incorporated into the price dynamics and volatility in 
the spot market. Our results are in contrast to Rittler (2012), who does not consider the 
impact of allowance submission and finds unidirectional information spillovers from the 
futures to the spot market, but not vice versa. Our results also differ from Milunovich 
and Joyeux (2010), who find minor relevance of information transmission in the 
volatility process at a lower frequency. As in our previous analyses, we find that the 
effects of allowance submission on volatility spillovers are more pronounced in the 
years 2009 and 2011 than in 2010.  
Our findings indicate that the dynamics of the EU emissions market during the 
compliance year 2009 are drastically different from those we observe during the 
compliance years 2008 and 2010. This is because of the differential market dynamics 
witnessed during these years. The 2008 compliance year can be overall characterized by 
a steady growth in the carbon emissions market, reaching double its 2007 value. But late 
2008 and early 2009 showed a deteriorating market, with lower oil and energy prices, 
and a sluggish economic outlook. During 2009, the global financial crisis intensified 
and industrial production in the EU dropped significantly, causing an unexpected deep 
decrease in demand for carbon emissions. By February 2009, EUA prices had 
plummeted to €8, versus €30 nine months earlier. According to the World Bank report, 
the carbon emission in the EU decreased by 11% from 2008 to 2009, following a 15% 
reduction in the EU industrial production in the same period (World Bank, 2012). 
Whilst the amount of carbon allowances allocated to firms is based on the forecast of 
industrial production, since firms emitted less than expected in 2009, the total amount of 
carbon allowances surrendered in April 2010 also declined considerably. On the supply 
side, the financial crisis stimulated financial institutions and private investors to 
deleverage and redirect their positions away from risky investments and toward safer 
assets and markets. This meant that the EU ETS project-based mechanisms, where 
operators implement projects that reduce emissions in emerging regions and use the 
resulting emission reduction units to help meet their own targets, were hard to 
implement and effectively came to a standstill. According to the World Bank, the 
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carbon market endured its most challenging year to date in 2009. In contrast and relative 
to the previous year, 2010 brought tranquillity with EUA prices stabilizing to a new 
equilibrium level of around €16. The year 2010 can be characterized by a move towards 
improvement of market mechanisms, implementing robust and transparent regulation, 
and building market confidence. Hence, we observe that the carbon market dynamics 
during the 2009 compliance year are distinct from those in 2008 and 2010. This 
explains the differential and insignificant impact of the allowance submission mandate 
in April 2010, whilst the impact is pronounced before and after the April 2009 and 2011 
submission mandates. All the above findings are also robust when considering order 
flow transactions sampled at various intraday time frequencies (such as 10 and 30 
minutes). 
Therefore, we contribute to the existing studies of the EU ETS carbon emission 
market and show that the April allowance submissions mandate significantly influences 
the carbon price dynamics. Furthermore, the results in this paper are of interest to 
investors and operators who manage carbon allowances and its derivatives for 
compliance, risk management, arbitrage, raising capital and profit-taking purposes. The 
distinct pricing efficiencies between the EU ETS carbon spot and futures contracts 
before and after the April submissions date have to be taken in consideration for 
effective hedging and risk management. The changing lag effects and liquidity changes 
due to the April submissions will aid arbitragers in understanding the price discovery 
process and the arbitrage opportunities in the EU ETS market. Additionally, the findings 
will also aid market makers in their liquidity management. Further, the results will be of 
special interest to regulators and carbon market designers aiming to improve the trading 
mechanisms of the EU ETS. To minimize the impact of the submission date on the 
carbon trading markets, several alternative submission mechanisms (and their 
implementation costs) should be considered, such as instituting multiple submission 
dates within the year or allowing operating firms to submit allowances in multiple 
instalments.    
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview 
of the EU ETS framework. Section 3 describes the construction of intraday spot and 
futures prices. Sections 4 and 5 investigate the impact of allowance submissions on 
carbon market mispricing dynamics and on information transmission between the spot 
and futures markets, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. The EU ETS compliance process and data construction 
EU ETS operates an annual compliance process of monitoring, reporting and 
verification of emissions by operating firms. The central authorities set a “cap” on the 
total amount of greenhouse gases that a country or region is allowed to emit within a 
calendar year. By the end of February, they allocate free GHG emission allowances to 
operating firms covered by the scheme. Firms‟ emissions during the year should not 
exceed the allocated allowance represented by their in-hand allowances; otherwise they 
must surrender additional allowances in the next calendar year to cover the excess 
emissions from the previous year and further pay a heavy civil penalty. The scheme 
involves regular monitoring of operators during the year starting from January to the 
end of December. Firms that emit more than their allocated allowances are required to 
undertake measures to reduce their emissions (for example, by investing in more 
efficient technologies and/or energy sources) or they can buy carbon allowances from 
another firm that has some emission allowances remaining. As a consequence, the total 
amount of emissions can be controlled and kept under a target level.  
By March 31 each year, the EU ETS requires all firms covered by the scheme to 
submit their verified annual emissions report to the European Commission, in line with 
the Monitoring and Reporting Regulation (MRR). The aggregate realized emissions 
data are then published by the Commission in early April. Operating firms are required 
to surrender the quantity of EUAs or other accepted carbon financial instruments 
corresponding to their GHG emissions in the previous year by April 30. The GHG 
emissions not covered by the surrendered carbon allowances incurred fines of €40 per 
CO2 ton in Phase I and €100 per CO2 ton in Phases II and III, which is significantly 
higher than the prices of carbon allowances. In addition, the uncovered carbon 
emissions are also deducted in the next compliance year. In Phase III, the EU ETS has 
introduced an enforcement regime whereby the civil penalty is enforced by the court of 
law if firms do not meet the legal requirement set by the EU ETS. Hence, the operating 
firms have a strong incentive to avoid the civil penalty. In this case, firms that do not 
have sufficient carbon allowances to surrender have to purchase the allowances for the 
uncovered emissions in the spot market before the submission date. For firms with spare 
carbon allowances, they have the incentive to sell these allowances for cash, especially 
in the current financial crisis when the costs of borrowing are high. For the above 
reasons, it is expected that trading in the carbon spot market will be more active in the 
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periods before the submission date than thereafter. This implies that the transmission of 
information may be different before and after the submission date. Further, since 
allowances surrendered are no longer traded, the changes in inventory resulting from 
April submissions each year can affect the trading behavior in carbon markets, 
especially on the spot market.  
To examine the effects of allowance submission on the EU ETS, the spot and futures 
price series are constructed based on order flow data from those markets. The spot 
market tick-by-tick data is provided by BlueNext Exchange, while futures markets data 
is obtained from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). For the empirical investigation, 
we use the Phase II transactions data on the EU ETS, which runs from 2008 to 2011. 
Since the allowance submission date for the previous year‟s emission falls on April 30 
in the following year, the first submission date in EU ETS Phase II is on April 30, 2009, 
and our sample period ends in December 31, 2011. For each year, we consider the 
futures contract expiring in December, which is the most liquid contract. The trading 
hours in the ICE and BlueNext exchange are 0700 to 1700 GMT. However, trading in 
the spot market is not active at the beginning and end of the trading day. To avoid 
illiquid trading, we only use the transactions occurring between 0900 and 1600 GMT. In 
order to convert irregular transaction data to equidistant price data at frequencies of h-
minutes, for each h-minute interval we compute the mean of the log prices of the 
immediate preceding and following transactions as the log price at the h-minute mark. 
For our analysis, we report the results for h=15-minute intervals.
1
 To avoid the intraday 
effects, the log price of the first trade immediately following 0900 is used as the price at 
the 0900 time interval each day, and the log price of the last trade immediately 
preceding 1600 is adopted as the price at the 1600 time interval each day.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
As preliminary evidence of the impact of allowance submissions, Figure 1 displays 
the mispricing pattern (i.e., the logarithmic difference between the observed and 
theoretical futures prices) in the carbon futures markets at the intraday frequency of 15-
minute intervals.
2
 We observe that the time series behavior of mispricing before the 
allowance submission date of April 30 is distinct from that after the submission date, 
                                                          
1
 We also consider 10-minute and 30-minute intraday frequencies for our tests. The empirical results are 
qualitatively identical to those for 15 minutes and hence not reported in the paper but are available upon 
request. 
2
 A similar mispricing pattern is observed in order-flow data for intraday 10- and 30-minute frequencies. 
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especially for the years 2009 and 2011. In particular, we see that in 2011, before May 
04, which is the first trading day after the submission date, the observed futures prices 
are persistently higher than the theoretical futures prices by around 2–8%. By contrast, 
after the submission date the futures mispricing hovers just above and below zero. This 
phenomenon may be driven by the fact that there is more trading activity before the 
submission date than afterwards, as market participants and operating firms unwind 
their hedge positions and rebalance their books. This is also reflected in the average 
value of daily futures open interest we observe before and after the submission date. 
More specifically, we compare the three-month average daily futures open interest 
before and after April 30. We find that the average size of the outstanding (long/short) 
futures trade positions systematically increases by 45%, 26% and 16% after the April 
submissions date for the years 2009 to 2011 respectively. Hence, we see the demand for 
hedging in the futures market revives once the compliance date has passed.  
 
 
3. Impact of allowance submission on the spot-futures dynamics 
 
3.1 Estimating mispricing in carbon markets 
Most studies use Brennan‟s (1958) cost-of-carry pricing relationship to estimate 
mispricing, where the theoretical futures is expressed as: 
( )( )*
,
t t tr u c T t
t T tF S e
   ,                                     (1)  
where Ft,T
*
 is the theoretical price of the futures contract at time t, maturing at time T; St 
is the spot price at time t; rt is the annualised risk-free rate; ut is the annualized cost of 
storage at time t; and ct is the annualised convenience yield. Mispricing at any time 
point t, Zt, is computed as: 
)( )*
, , ,ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( )
t t tr u c T t
t t T t T t T tZ F F F S e
      ,                                         (2)  
where Ft,T is the observed futures price at time t. A number of previous studies use the 
cost-of-carry relationship for carbon markets (see, for example, Joyeux and Milunovich 
(2010), Rittler (2012), among others). Since carbon assets in the EU ETS are 
electronically registered and incur little cost, as in previous studies we assume the cost 
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of storage (ut) for carbon allowances to be zero. For the risk-free rate (rt), following 
Rittler (2012), we use the monthly EURIBOR on a daily basis.  
We allow for non-zero convenience yield for holding carbon allowances and employ 
the option-implied methodology recently developed by Hochradl and Rammerstorfer 
(2012) to estimate the convenience yield. This method is based on the original economic 
idea of convenience yield, where the convenience yield is defined as the benefit of 
holding spot assets rather than futures assets. The convenience yield is estimated as the 
difference between a put option on a spot contract and another put option on a futures 
contract. Previous studies debate the existence of convenience yield in carbon emission 
markets. Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) and Joyeux and Milunovich (2010) argue 
that firms only require carbon allowances annually to meet the regulatory requirements 
and thus the convenience yield in carbon markets should be insignificant. Conversely, 
Trück, Borak, Härdle and Weron (2007), Chevallier (2009) and Daskalakis, Psychoyios 
and Markellos (2009) observe that carbon futures markets have a significant 
convenience yield. Since the GHG emissions are uncertain during the year, and due to 
the high transaction costs and illiquidity in carbon markets compared to major stock 
exchanges, there can be significant benefit to be gained from possessing spot carbon 
allowances, and thus the convenience yield in carbon markets is not zero. Furthermore, 
Rittler (2012) shows that the theoretical carbon futures prices with zero convenience 
yield are persistently higher than the observed futures prices, which could constitute 
evidence for the existence of convenience yield. Hence we account for convenience 
yield in the cost-of-carry relationship. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The summary statistics for mispricing observed at the intraday frequency of 15 
minutes are reported in Table 1. The statistics for the various sample periods display 
non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis, and the results of Jarque-Bera tests show 
significant deviation from Gaussianity. We find that in 2009 and 2011 the average 
mispricing and its standard deviation are significantly larger before the submission date 
than after. In addition, in 2009 and 2011, we observe a negative skewness in the 
mispricing distribution before the submission date, in contrast to a positive skewness 
after the submission date. This indicates large negative movements in mispricing before 
the April submission date. Further, we observe that the values of kurtosis before the 
submission date are almost double those afterward. Overall, this cursory investigation 
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reveals clear changes in the distribution of mispricing before and after the submission 
date. For the year 2010, we do not observe such distinctive variations in the distribution. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
To provide a further examination of the distributional characteristics of mispricing, 
we present in Figure 2 kernel density estimates pre- and post-submission date. The 
figure demonstrates a shift in the distribution of mispricing further to the left following 
the submission date in 2009, while in 2011 we observe a clear shift in the distribution of 
mispricing further to the right. The steep density curve before the submission date in 
2009 widens and is higher post-submission date. Similar but more pronounced change is 
seen in 2011, where we observe the density curve distinctly higher and much more 
concentrated around the average after the submission date. We see no noticeable change 
in the kernel density estimations in 2010. This is consistent with the summary statistics 
reported above. 
 
 
3.2 Analysis of carbon market mispricing  
In order to examine the effects of allowance submissions, we model the carbon 
mispricing dynamics (Zt) using non-linear equilibrium correction models. In a 
frictionless market, Zt will fluctuate around zero, with an immediate adjustment process 
when prices deviate from the equilibrium. However, market imperfections such as 
transaction costs, illiquidity, trading behavior and regulations act as limits to 
equilibrium correction within a certain upper and lower bound. It is increasingly 
documented that the spot-futures mispricing relationship is nonlinear, due to the 
presence of such constraints, and market regulations significantly alter this relationship 
(see, for example, McMillan and Philip (2012)). Since the allowance submissions affect 
the trading activities in the emission allowance spot market much more than the futures, 
one might expect the mispricing dynamics to be altered pre- and post-submission date.  
We first examine changes in the carbon mispricing relationship using the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) model of Tong (1978, 1990), as defined in the following equation: 
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k
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  
  
 

       
     
      (3) 
where It is a heaviside indicator function that is equal to one if Zt-1 is above the threshold 
and zero otherwise, and Dt is a dummy variable that is equal to one during the period 
before the submission date (April 30) and zero thereafter. We include k lags of the 
dependent variable (ΔZ) in the regressions to account for autocorrelation. We use the 
SIC information criteria as well as the significance of the autoregressive lags in order to 
obtain the optimal lag length k. For the various regression time periods considered, an 
optimal lag length of around 6 is obtained. The coefficient δ captures the difference in 
equilibrium levels between the two periods, with ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 and ρ4 parameters 
determining the speed of mean reversion. In particular, ρ1 and ρ2 govern the speed of 
adjustment in the upper regimes, while ρ3 and ρ4 are related to the speed of adjustment 
in the lower regimes. Symmetric adjustment holds if -2<ρ1=ρ2<0 or if -2<ρ3=ρ4<0 in 
each subperiod, and the evidence of asymmetric adjustment can be seen when ρ1≠ρ3 or 
ρ2≠ρ4 and both lie between -2 and 0.  
Several approaches are adopted in order to determine the value of the threshold. The 
simplest method is to set the threshold at zero. This is an economically meaningful 
value and in this case, the underlying cointegrating vector derived from the TAR model 
would correspond to the attractor. However, in order to allow the value of the threshold 
to differ from the attractor and, more importantly, time-vary, we adopt two alternative 
methods. The first approach involves a recursive estimation based on Chan‟s (1993) 
procedure, whereby the above regression is run over a number of possible threshold 
values (discarding the largest and smallest 10 percent values) and the optimal threshold 
value is determined based on the conditional least squares (CLS) methodology. Chan 
(1993) shows that the estimated threshold value is in fact super-consistent and is much 
more precise than other alternative methods. For comparison, we also implement time-
varying thresholds by using a simple moving average methodology. In this case, the 
threshold values are the simple 10-day moving average of mispricing values (Zt). The 
results reported in Table 2 are based on Chan‟s (1993) procedure, with the results 
obtained by using the moving average being qualitatively very similar (and reported in 
the online appendix).  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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We observe several interesting points. First, the Wald test results for ρ1=ρ3 and ρ2=ρ4 
are rejected in most cases, showing that the speed of adjustment is different in the two 
regimes. This supports the use of the TAR model instead of the linear adjustment 
process for the mispricing dynamics. Second, all the intercept terms are positive and 
significant, suggesting a positive long-run equilibrium. The coefficient δ is significant 
and positive in 2009 and 2011, showing that the equilibrium level decreases after the 
allowance submissions in April. In 2010 we observe δ to be negative and significant 
during the period February to July (at the 1% level) and February to August (at the 10% 
level), but insignificant in the period running from February to October. The results 
suggest a temporal increase in the equilibrium level after the submission of allowances, 
with the effect decaying as time passes.  
Examining the parameters associated with the speed of mean-reversion, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3 and 
ρ4 are all negative and significant, showing that the futures mispricing, Zt, is stationary 
in all the subperiods. This implies that the spot and futures returns are cointegrated with 
each other before and after the submission date. Since the main concern of this paper is 
with the effects of allowance submissions, we test whether the speed of adjustment is 
statistically similar before and after the April submission date, for both the upper and 
lower regimes, using Wald tests. The null hypotheses of ρ1=ρ2 and ρ3=ρ4 are rejected 
for all the subperiods in 2009, which suggests the speed of mean-reversion in both the 
upper and lower regimes significantly changes after the submission date in 2009. ρ1=ρ2 
and ρ3=ρ4 are also rejected in the period running from February to July 2010, but cannot 
be rejected for the other subperiods in 2010. This shows that the impact of allowance 
submission on mean-reverting speeds lessens over time in 2010. For 2011, we only 
reject the null of ρ3=ρ4 for the all subperiods, indicating that the submission of 
allowances in 2011 significantly affects the speed of adjustment in the lower regime.
3
 
Overall, the above results suggest that allowance submissions significantly impact the 
mispricing relationship, with significant changes to the equilibrium level as well as the 
speed of adjustment in all three years. The effects are persistent in 2009 and 2011 but 
weaker in 2010. 
                                                          
3
 It can be observed from Figure 1 that there are some extreme observations in the intraday mispricing 
series in 2011. These observations are normally at the beginning of a trading day, perhaps because of 
illiquidity. We also examine the impact of allowance submissions after removing these observations, with 
the results qualitatively very similar. 
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The above estimated TAR model imposes abrupt regime switches, which requires a 
number of unrealistic assumptions, such as all the agents holding homogeneous 
expectations, and incurs the same interest rates and transaction costs (Monoyios and 
Sarno, 2002). Consequently, smooth-transition models have been preferred over TAR 
models. In order to allow for a smooth change of regimes, we employ the quadratic-
logistic smooth-transition (QLSTR) model developed by Jansen and Teräsvirta (1996), 
where the adjustment of small deviations from the equilibrium is allowed to differ from 
that of large deviations, and which takes into account smooth shifts between regimes. In 
addition, unlike the single threshold for each side in the TAR model, the QLSTR model 
allows for different threshold points to be set for both sides of the attractor. This enables 
us to examine how the allowance submission influences the no-arbitrage boundaries as 
well as the speed of transition between the two regimes. We estimate the following 
QLSTR model: 
1
1
0,1 1,1 1 0,1 1,1 1 1 1 1,1 1 2,1
0,2 1,2 1 0,2 1,2 1 2 1 1,2 1 2,2
1
( )(1 exp( ( )( )))
( )(1 exp( ( )( ))) (1 )
t t t t t t
k
t t t t t i t i t
i
Z Z Z Z c Z c D
Z Z Z c Z c D Z
    
      


   
    

         
 
            
  
 (4)  
where γi is the parameter for the speed of transition between the two regimes; c1,i  and  
c2,i are the lower and upper threshold boundaries of the inner regime, which determines 
the locations where the adjustment process switches regimes; and α1,i and β1,i govern the 
speed of adjustment in the inner and outer regimes respectively. More precisely, the 
speed of mean-reversion in the outer regime is determined by the sum of α1,i and β1,i, 
where i=1 represents the period before the submission date (April 30) each year, and 
i=2 for the periods thereafter. If γi→0, we get a linear ADF model, while if γi→∞, the 
function becomes zero for c1,i<Zt<c2,i and is equal to one for Zt<c1,i and Zt>c2,i. At the 
point of transition, the model allows different adjustment behaviors for positive and 
negative deviations. Hence the model nests the Balke and Fomby (1997) three-regime 
threshold model. The optimal lag length for the autoregressive component, k, is 
determined by the SIC information criteria as well as the significance of the 
autoregressive coefficients. We report the main results of the QLSTR model in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
We find that the absolute value of β1 is increasing each year, implying that the 
market is becoming more mature and therefore can correct the mispricing more quickly. 
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The parameters of interest in Equation (4) are those that determine the speed of regime 
transition, the speed of mean-reversion, and the upper and lower threshold boundaries of 
the no-arbitrage space. Five Wald-tests are conducted to examine whether the speed of 
adjustment in the inner and outer regimes, the speed of transition, and the location of the 
upper and lower no-arbitrage boundaries are statistically similar before and after the 
submission date. The test for the null hypotheses of α1,1=α1,2 and β1,1=β1,2 shows that the 
allowance submission date significantly affects the speed of mean-reversion in the inner 
and outer regimes in 2009 and 2011, but not in 2010. Further, we notice that the 
parameter related to the speed of regime transition, γ, does not significantly alter due to 
the submission date, since we cannot reject the null of γ1=γ2 in all years. This shows that 
the allowance submissions do not have a significant impact on the speed of transition 
within the inner and outer regimes.  
The most interesting parameters in the model are the upper and lower threshold 
parameters, c1 and c2. Although we observe long-run equilibrium level shifts after the 
submission date in all three years, if c1 and c2 do not significantly alter, the movement of 
the equilibrium level does not necessarily induce the significant change in arbitrage 
behavior. The Wald test results for c1,1=c1,2 and c2,1=c2,2 indicate that both the upper and 
lower threshold boundaries of the no-arbitrage space alter after the submission date in 
2009 and 2011. For 2010, we observe a significant change in the lower boundary just 
after the submission date in April; however the effects do not persist in the subsequent 
periods.  
To summarize, the results so far show significant changes in the mean-reverting 
process, with equilibrium level and speed of mean-reversion within regimes, as well as 
the no-arbitrage bands, significantly different pre- and post-submission date. These 
findings suggest that the submission of carbon allowances in April affects the 
mispricing relationship and arbitrage activities in carbon markets. 
 
 
4. Impact of allowance submission on information transmission  
 
In this section, we examine whether allowance submissions affect the transmission 
of information between carbon spot and futures markets. Hence, we first test for 
changes to the short-term price discovery process underlying the two markets using 
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Granger causality analysis and also investigate for any changes in the joint volatility 
dynamics between markets using volatility spillover analysis. 
 
 
4.1 Price discovery analysis  
Operating firms with insufficient carbon allowances in hand have to purchase the 
additional allowances in the secondary market before the submission date in order to 
avoid severe financial punishment. Thus, trading activities in the carbon spot and 
futures markets will be more pronounced in the lead up to the submission date than 
afterward. Further, firms holding EUA futures to hedge against anticipated compliance 
exposure will unwind their positions with physical settlement. As market participants 
rebalance their books, there will be more active trading in the spot before the 
submissions date. 
The analysis of price discovery serves to determine how the newly arrived 
information is incorporated into the price dynamics of the two interlinked markets. 
Previous studies such as Uhrig-Homburg and Wagner (2009) and Chevallier (2010) 
document the leadership of carbon futures market in the price discovery process, when 
analyzed on a daily frequency. However, Rittler (2012) observes a bidirectional 
feedback mechanism between the spot and futures carbon markets when using price 
information on an intraday frequency. The central question that we ask is whether the 
price discovery process is influenced by allowance submissions. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We adopt Granger causality tests, developed by Granger (1969), to study the lead-lag 
relationship between the spot and futures carbon markets before and after the 
submission date. The test is based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model that 
examines the joint significance in the lagged returns of one market in the equation of the 
other market within the VAR system.
4
 We report the F-test results from Granger 
causality tests in Table 4. For all sample periods considered from 2009 to 2011, we 
strongly reject the null hypothesis (at the 1% level) that the spot market does not 
Granger-cause the futures market, while also strongly rejecting the null hypothesis (at 
the 1% level) that the futures market does not Granger-cause the spot market (except in 
                                                          
4
 The optimal lags for the VAR specifications are determined using the Schwarz information criterion, 
although using the Hannan-Quinn information criterion provides a very similar lag selection. 
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the period February-April 2009). For the years 2009 and 2011, when we consider the 
value of the F-test statistics, we find a stronger Granger causality from the spot to the 
futures market in the periods before the submission date (indicated by larger F-test 
statistics) than after the submission date, where we find a stronger Granger causality 
from the futures market to the spot market. The results indicate that, although in line 
with Rittler (2012) there is bidirectional information transmission between carbon spot 
and futures returns, the spot market is the predominant contributor to the price discovery 
process before the allowance submission date, while the futures market provides price 
leadership after the allowance submissions. We observe that spot trading becomes more 
important and informationally relevant over the first quarter of each year due to the 
buying and selling of spot contracts as part of the compliance process. That is, firms buy 
allowances for compliance purposes on the spot market when in deficit, while firms sell 
their allowances on the spot market when an excess supply exists. For 2010, we find 
that the spot market provides a stronger price leadership than the futures market before 
as well as after the allowance submissions. This result may be driven by the fact that the 
EUA market experienced a large sell-off of allowances, mostly in the spot market, as 
operators as well as trading and financial companies monetized allowances to raise 
funds in the midst of the financial credit crunch. Overall, the findings suggest that the 
submission of carbon allowances impacts the price discovery process in carbon markets. 
 
 
4.2 Volatility spillovers 
We now examine whether allowance submissions affect the dynamics of volatility 
transmission between carbon spot and futures. Ritter (2012) documents a close 
relationship between the volatility dynamics of carbon spot and futures markets, with 
spillovers observed from the volatility and shocks in the futures market into the spot 
market.  Hence, we analyze volatility spillovers among the two markets and the extent 
to which the volatility transmission process is influenced by emission allowance 
submissions. 
We formulate a bivariate case of the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility 
(HAR-RV) model proposed by Corsi (2009) to capture the joint volatility dynamics of 
the two markets. Chevallier and Sevi (2011) observe that that the HAR-RV model 
outperforms several GARCH specifications in terms of dynamic modeling and 
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forecasting accuracy for carbon emission futures. We augment the model with a dummy 
variable that represents the period before the allowance submissions date. In particular, 
we estimate the following equation: 
1 1 5 ( 1| 5) 22 ( 1| 22)( ) +t t t t t t t t       v α β v β v β v D ε ,       (5) 
where vt = (RVFt  RVSt )ꞌ is the vector of realized volatilities at time t; RVFt and RVSt are 
the daily realized volatility in the futures and the spot market at time t respectively, 
where daily realized volatility is estimated as the summation of the intraday squared 
returns (see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys, 2003 for details); Dt = (Dt 1-Dt )ꞌ, 
where Dt is the dummy variable that represents the period before the submissions date; 
and vt-1|t-k = (RVFt-1|t-k  RVS t-1|t-k )ꞌ is the vector of the lagged realized volatilities from 
the spot and futures market, where  
( 1| )
1
1 k
t t k t j
j
RVF RVF
k
  

  and 
( 1| )
1
1 k
t t k t j
j
RVS RVS
k
  

  for k = 5 and 22 corresponding to 5-day and 22-day realized 
volatility. Hence, this framework consists of three volatility components, including 
daily, weekly and monthly realized volatilities. Each of the components corresponds to 
various response times of different groups of investors to the arrival of new information. 
An intuitive interpretation of the HAR-RV framework is that it allows for volatility 
patterns over longer intervals to associate with those over shorter intervals (Corsi, 2009). 
Hence, using this framework, we are able to study the impact of allowance submissions 
on the short-term as well as long-term volatility spillover effects between the carbon 
spot and futures markets. The parameters of interest are the coefficients of the slope (β) 
matrix, βi,S,k and βi,F,k, corresponding to the spot and futures markets respectively, where 
i=1 for the period before the submissions date (April 30) each year and i=2 for the 
periods thereafter.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 presents the results of the bivariate HAR-RV model in Equation (8). For the 
period before the submission date, we find that the short-term variance component of 
the spot market (β1,S,1) significantly affects the current volatility of the futures market in 
all years (2009-2011), while the long-term variance component of the spot market 
(β1,S,22) is significant for 2009 and 2011. We also observe that the medium-term 
variance component is significant, with negative impact, in 2011. However, the 
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spillover coefficients from the spot to the futures market become mostly insignificant 
after the submissions date. In the case of the spot market, we observe that there are no 
volatility spillover effects from the futures market before the submission date; however, 
this evidence is reversed in the period after the submission date. In particular, we find 
marginal significance for the futures market long-term variance component in 2009 and 
2010, while in 2011, we observe a strong significance for the short-term and medium-
term variance components underlying the futures market. The results indicate that the 
futures market volatility has a significant impact on the spot market volatility only in the 
period after the submission date.  
The Likelihood Ratio tests for the joint significance of the short-, medium- and long-
term variance components in the periods before and after the submission date confirm 
that the volatility spillovers from the spot to the futures market are statistically 
significant in the periods before the submission date. After the allowance submission 
date, price discovery happens mainly in the futures market, with informational 
spillovers strongly significant only in 2011. The results are driven by the fact that the 
transactions in the spot market are much more active before the submission date and 
hence any new information released will be first incorporated into the volatility 
dynamics of the spot market, subsequently spilling over to the futures market volatility. 
Our results differ from those of Rittler (2012), who does not take into account the 
allowance submissions effect and observes volatility spillovers only from the carbon 
futures to the spot market, but not vice versa. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effects of allowance submissions on the relationship 
between the spot and futures markets using the intraday order flow transactions data in 
the Phase II commitment period of the EU ETS. By April 30 each year, operating firms 
are required by law to disclose their emissions from the preceding year and surrender 
sufficient carbon allowances to cover their emissions. It is expected that the buying and 
selling of the carbon allowances in the spot and futures markets will be much more 
active before the submission date than after. Also, the surrender of carbon allowances in 
April will reduce the inventory level of carbon assets impacting trading behavior after 
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the submission date. Hence we investigate whether the price dynamics between the 
European carbon spot and futures markets are affected by the allowance submission 
mandate in April.   
First, we test for changes in the cross-market efficiency of the spot-futures dynamics 
and find that nature of the mispricing before the submission date differs significantly 
from that after the April submission date. More specifically, we find that the mispricing 
equilibrium level and the adjustment speed, as well as the no-arbitrage boundaries, shift 
subsequent to the submission date. This shows that the behavior of arbitrage activities is 
influenced by allowance submissions. Second, we test whether the transmission of 
information between the spot and futures markets is affected by allowance submissions. 
For this, we investigate the changes in the short-term causality structure between the 
spot and futures markets using Granger causality tests. Further, using the bivariate 
heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility (HAR-RV) model, we test for changes 
in the dynamics of volatility transmission between carbon spot and futures markets. The 
results show that, although in line with previous studies spot and futures markets 
Granger-cause each other, the spot market is the leading market before the submission 
date, while the futures market takes the leading role after the submission date. This 
indicates that the spot market plays a dominant role in the price discovery process 
before the April submissions, after which the futures market subsumes this dominant 
informational role. In terms of the joint volatility dynamics, we find a change in the 
volatility spillovers mechanism between the spot and futures markets, with volatility 
spillovers from the spot market to the futures market before the submission date and 
volatility spillovers from the futures to the spot market thereafter. This is driven by the 
fact that trading activities in the spot market are much more active in the periods before 
the submission date as market participants unwind their compliance hedge positions 
with physical settlement and balance their books. Thus, any new information revealed in 
the market is swiftly incorporated into the price dynamics and volatility of the spot 
market. These results contrast with previous studies, which do not take into account the 
impact of the allowance submissions, and find unidirectional spillovers from the futures 
to the spot market. The results are much more prominent in 2009 and 2011 than in 2010, 
due to decline of GHG emissions in the EU during the 2009 compliance year, caused by 
the significant drop in output (industrial production) and intensified global financial 
crisis. 
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In conclusion, this paper finds that the submission of allowances has a significant 
impact on the efficiency of the spot-futures dynamics as well as on the transmission of 
information between the spot and futures markets. The above findings are robust to 
order flow transactions sampled at different intraday time frequencies. The results 
indicate that in modeling the relationship between carbon spot and futures prices, the 
impact of the submissions date should be taken into consideration. The findings of this 
paper are of interest to investors and market makers operating in the carbon emissions 
market. The distinct pricing efficiencies between the EU ETS carbon spot and futures 
contracts before and after the April submissions date have to be taken in consideration 
for effective hedging and risk management. The changing lag effects and liquidity 
changes due to the April submissions will aid arbitragers in understanding the price 
discovery process and the arbitrage opportunities in the EU ETS market. Additionally, 
the findings will also aid market makers in their liquidity management. Further, our 
results will be of special interest to regulators and market designers who ensure the 
well-functioning of the emissions trading program. To minimize the impact of the 
submission date on the carbon trading markets, several alternative submission 
mechanisms (and their implementation costs) should be considered, such as instituting 
multiple submission dates within the year or allowing operating firms to submit 
allowances in multiple instalments.  
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Figure 1: Intraday mispricing of carbon markets 
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Note: The figure shows the intraday mispricing of carbon futures from February to November each year (2009-
2011), using 15-minute order flow transactions data. The carbon futures mispricing is computed as the 
difference between the observed futures prices and the theoretical futures prices. 
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimation of carbon market mispricing 
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Note: The figure shows kernel density estimates of carbon futures mispricing before and after the submission 
date each year. The results in 2009, 2010 and 2011 are shown in Panels A, B and C, respectively.  
Table 1: Summary statistics for mispricing 
 2009 02-04 2009 05-07 2010 02-04 2010 05-07 2011 02-04 2011 05-07 
Mean  0.0124 0.0094 0.0063 0.0083 0.0362 0.0080 
Std. Dev. 0.0223 0.0114 0.0082 0.0088 0.0148 0.0098 
Skewness -0.918 0.847 -0.433 -0.029 -2.114 0.701 
Kurtosis 11.980 6.174 4.383 4.471 28.086 16.276 
Jarque-Bera 6294.107*** 969.689*** 202.835*** 167.672*** 43011.170*** 13352.160*** 
Note: The table provides the summary statistics for mispricing, observed at the intraday frequency of 15 minutes, 
for the various sample periods. „2009 02-04‟ indicates the sample period covering February 2009 to April 2009, 
and by analogy for the rest of the sample periods. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels respectively.  
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Table 2: Estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model 
 α δ ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 ρ1=ρ2  ρ3=ρ4 ρ1=ρ3  ρ2=ρ4 
Panel A:  Year 2009       
Feb-Jul  0.0016*** 
(3.120) 
0.0023*** 
(3.561) 
-0.3631*** 
(-12.370) 
-0.2357*** 
(-4.882) 
-0.2696*** 
(-10.814) 
-0.1551*** 
(-3.805) 
6.245** 6.983*** 10.654*** 2.177 
Feb-Aug 0.0012*** 
(3.105) 
0.0026*** 
(4.869) 
-0.3363*** 
(-12.835) 
-0.2127*** 
(-5.308) 
-0.2796*** 
(-11.787) 
-0.1400*** 
(-3.786) 
8.270*** 12.190*** 12.311*** 2.919* 
Feb-Oct 0.0009*** 
(3.628) 
0.0028*** 
(6.357) 
-0.3027*** 
(-13.682) 
-0.1720*** 
(-6.158) 
-0.2918*** 
(-12.322) 
-0.1877*** 
(-6.071) 
17.140*** 8.666*** 14.265*** 4.919** 
Panel B:  Year 2010       
Feb-Jul  0.0011*** 
(4.904) 
-0.0011*** 
(-3.270) 
-0.0617*** 
(-2.593) 
-0.1402*** 
(-7.186) 
-0.3385*** 
(-7.898) 
-0.1955*** 
(-4.085) 
7.149*** 5.080** 25.142*** 1.025 
Feb-Aug 0.0005*** 
(3.039) 
-0.0005* 
(-1.672) 
-0.0616*** 
(-2.663) 
-0.1040*** 
(-6.090) 
-0.3386*** 
(-8.108) 
-0.3053*** 
(-7.967) 
2.360 0.357 26.443*** 19.766*** 
Feb-Oct 0.0004*** 
(3.040) 
-0.0004 
(-1.283) 
-0.0598*** 
(-2.893) 
-0.0967*** 
(-7.019) 
-0.3408*** 
(-8.888) 
-0.3408*** 
(-9.523) 
2.393 0.519 29.973*** 29.967*** 
Panel C:  Year 2011       
Feb-Jul  0.0009*** 
(3.637) 
0.0057*** 
(8.682) 
-0.1357*** 
(-9.845) 
-0.1721*** 
(-5.370) 
-0.2035*** 
(-10.752) 
-0.1122*** 
(-5.157) 
1.151 11.099*** 31.404*** 3.261* 
Feb-Aug 0.0009*** 
(4.632) 
0.0064*** 
(10.147) 
-0.1497*** 
(-11.215) 
-0.1804*** 
(-6.063) 
-0.2248*** 
(-12.284) 
-0.1264*** 
(-6.731) 
0.933 15.771*** 38.852*** 3.561* 
Feb-Oct 0.0012*** 
(7.977) 
0.0074*** 
(14.661) 
-0.2080*** 
(-16.867) 
-0.2028*** 
(-10.650) 
-0.5952*** 
(-22.167) 
-0.1872*** 
(-10.620) 
0.057 184.840*** 52.425*** 5.053** 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of the threshold autoregressive (TAR) model in Equation (3). The thresholds are determined by using Chan‟s (1993) procedure. 
α+δ and α are the intercept terms during the period before and after the submission date (April 30) each year, respectively. The values in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
Columns ρ1= ρ2, ρ3= ρ4, ρ1= ρ3 and ρ2= ρ4 present the Wald statistic results testing for equality of regression coefficients. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively.   
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Table 3: Estimation results of the quadratic-logistic smooth transition (QLSTR) model 
 α0,i α1,i β0,i β1,i γi c1,i c2,i α1,1= α1,2 β1,1= β1,2 γ1= γ2 c1,1=c1,2 c2,1=c2,2 
         Panel A:  Year 2009         
Feb-Jul:   i=1 
 
0.0036*** 
(4.769) 
-0.2514*** 
(-6.693) 
-0.0052*** 
(-4.520) 
-0.2096*** 
(-5.137) 
108246.900 
(0.258) 
-0.0014*** 
(-2.587) 
0.0668*** 
(91.915) 
7.938*** 3.753* 0.102 11.853*** 58.389*** 
 i=2 
     
0.0008 
(1.430) 
-0.1009** 
(-2.374) 
0.0035 
(1.357) 
-0.3866*** 
(-4.711) 
17284.640 
(0.810) 
-0.0088*** 
(-4.567) 
0.0453*** 
(17.682) 
Feb-Aug: i=1 
 
0.0036*** 
(5.157) 
-0.2530*** 
(-7.242) 
-0.0053*** 
(-4.870) 
-0.2093*** 
(-5.503) 
108246.900 
(0.277) 
-0.0014*** 
(-2.780) 
0.0668*** 
(96.892) 
10.858*** 4.460** 0.117 14.394*** 69.530*** 
i=2 0.0006 
(1.453) 
-0.0964*** 
(-2.650) 
0.0031 
(1.453) 
-0.3822*** 
(-5.248) 
17284.640 
(0.915) 
-0.0087*** 
(-5.108) 
0.0452*** 
(19.191) 
Feb-Oct:  i=1 0.0036*** 
(5.534) 
-0.2482*** 
(-7.816) 
-0.0052*** 
(-5.252) 
-0.2089*** 
(-5.983) 
108246.900 
(0.298) 
-0.0014*** 
(-2.992) 
0.0668*** 
(107.114) 
15.230*** 6.726*** 0.135 0.300 134.840*** 
i=2 0.0001 
(0.393) 
-0.0856*** 
(-2.822) 
-0.0006 
(-0.621) 
-0.3754*** 
(-6.923) 
17284.51 
(0.917) 
-0.0042 
(-0.948) 
0.0453*** 
(27.943) 
Panel B:  Year 2010         
Feb-Jul:   i=1 
 
-0.0014 
(-0.572) 
-0.0897 
(-0.713) 
0.0121 
(1.626) 
-0.4747* 
(-1.713) 
5421.904 
(1.300) 
-0.0219*** 
(-5.200) 
0.0156*** 
(2.586) 
0.527 1.543 0.002 7.345*** 0.008 
 i=2 
     
0.0081 
(0.570) 
-0.4406 
(-0.944) 
-0.0070 
(-0.499) 
0.2177 
(0.450) 
9277.955 
(0.115) 
0.0142 
(1.125) 
0.0499 
(0.127) 
Feb-Aug: i=1 
 
-0.0014 
(-0.589) 
-0.0912 
(-0.745) 
0.0122* 
(1.697) 
-0.4814* 
(-1.788) 
5419.885 
(1.354) 
-0.0219*** 
(-5.420) 
0.0157*** 
(2.669) 
0.025 0.263 1.402 0.127 0.003 
i=2 0.0198 
(0.084) 
0.4571 
(0.131) 
-0.0330 
(-0.093) 
-1.3828 
(-0.796) 
668.347** 
(2.544) 
0.0221 
(0.179) 
0.0221 
(0.179) 
Feb-Oct:  i=1 -0.0014 
(-0.626) 
-0.0910 
(-0.790) 
0.0121* 
(1.801) 
-0.4796* 
(-1.897) 
5418.831 
(1.436) 
-0.0219*** 
(-5.752) 
0.0157*** 
(2.837) 
0.008 0.005 0.884 0.011 0.000 
i=2 0.2700 
(0.073) 
-4.8778 
(-0.098) 
-0.3143 
(-0.098) 
3.5576 
(0.062) 
4.0154 
(0.001) 
0.0411 
(0.069) 
10.8871 
(0.001) 
Panel C:  Year 2011         
Feb-Jul:   i=1 
 
0.0018 
(1.117) 
-0.0437 
(-1.438) 
0.0100*** 
(3.982) 
-0.8005*** 
(-17.025) 
3263.053 
(1.447) 
0.0136*** 
(10.886) 
0.0917*** 
(10.886) 
2.470 10.993*** 0.087 2.648 19.691*** 
              i=2 
     
-0.0095** 
(-2.317) 
0.1324 
(1.226) 
0.0115*** 
(2.805) 
-0.4060*** 
(-3.673) 
111991.900 
(0.305) 
0.0229*** 
(8.662) 
0.0539*** 
(29.435) 
Feb-Aug: i=1 
 
0.0018 
(1.192) 
-0.0449 
(-1.543) 
0.0106*** 
(4.205) 
-0.8393*** 
(-18.850) 
3260.655 
(1.507) 
0.0917*** 
(11.501) 
0.0131*** 
(2.634) 
5.487** 12.360*** 0.124 3.824* 21.827*** 
              i=2 -0.0126*** 
(-3.432) 
0.1943** 
(1.984) 
0.0145*** 
(3.937) 
-0.4592*** 
(-4.588) 
111991.900 
(0.382) 
0.0233*** 
(22.694) 
0.0539*** 
(33.575) 
Feb-Oct:  i=1 0.0019 
(1.368) 
-0.0481* 
(-1.778) 
0.0108*** 
(4.680) 
-0.8721*** 
(-21.245) 
3260.623* 
(1.678) 
0.0131*** 
(2.971) 
0.0918*** 
(12.684) 
6.368** 19.254*** 0.196 4.725** 26.721*** 
              i=2 -0.0124*** 
(-3.804) 
0.1836** 
(2.091) 
0.0140*** 
(4.301) 
-0.4463*** 
(-4.996) 
11991.900 
(0.447) 
0.0231*** 
(26.014) 
0.0539*** 
(38.232) 
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Note: The table reports the estimation results of the quadratic-logistic smooth transition (QLSTR) model in Equation (4). α1,i and β1,I are the speed of mean reversion 
parameters; γi is the speed of regime transition parameter; c1,i  is the lower and c2,i  is the upper threshold boundary of the regimes in the i
th
 subperiod. i=1 corresponds to the 
periods before the submission date (April 30) each year, and i=2 corresponds to the periods thereafter. The values in parentheses are the t-statistics. Columns α1,1= α1,2, β1,1= β1,2, 
γ1= γ2, c1,1=c1,2 and c2,1=c2,2 present the Wald statistic results testing for equality of regression coefficients. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.   
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Table 4: Estimation results of Granger causality tests 
 Spot≠>Futures Futures≠>Spot 
Panel A: Year 2009 
Feb-Apr  23.845*** 
(0.000) 
0.476 
(0.874) 
May-Jul 3.328*** 
(0.002) 
21.854*** 
(0.000) 
May-Aug 5.540*** 
(0.000) 
26.348*** 
(0.000) 
May-Oct 11.440*** 
(0.000) 
30.561*** 
(0.000) 
Panel B: Year 2010 
Feb-Apr 13.201*** 
(0.000) 
5.717*** 
(0.000) 
May-Jul 14.799*** 
(0.000) 
14.263*** 
(0.000) 
May-Aug 24.167*** 
(0.000) 
4.290*** 
(0.000) 
May-Oct 32.190*** 
(0.000) 
5.109*** 
(0.000) 
Panel C: Year 2011 
Feb-Apr  9.731*** 
(0.000) 
7.340*** 
(0.001) 
May-Jul 3.487*** 
(0.001) 
32.638*** 
(0.000) 
May-Aug 2.881*** 
(0.003) 
47.397*** 
(0.000) 
May-Oct 3.834*** 
(0.000) 
57.652*** 
(0.000) 
Note: The table reports the F-statistic results of Granger causality tests. The optimal lags are selected based on 
the Schwarz information criterion. The column Spot≠>Futures presents the results for the null hypothesis that 
the spot market does not Granger cause the futures market and the column Futures≠>Spot presents the results 
for the null hypothesis that the futures market does not Granger-cause the spot market. Robust p-values are 
presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
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Table 5: Estimation results of heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility (HAR-
RV) model 
 
2009   2010  2011 
RVF RVS  RVF RVS  RVF RVS 
α1 
-1.0949*** 
(-5.643) 
0.1953 
(1.056) 
 -0.0026 
(-0.014) 
0.2991* 
(1.656) 
 -9.5363*** 
(-6.191) 
-2.5576 
(-1.127) 
β1,F,1 
-0.0710 
(-0.870) 
-0.0289 
(-0.372) 
 0.0647 
(0.396) 
0.1194 
(0.774) 
 -0.5961*** 
(-6.859) 
-0.0035 
(-0.275) 
β1,F,5 
-0.2795 
(-1.419) 
-0.2319 
(-1.234) 
 -0.1457 
(-0.245) 
0.6555 
(1.167) 
 0.3503 
(1.012) 
0.0012 
(0.002) 
β1,F,22 
-2.8771*** 
(-5.180) 
0.7101 
(1.341) 
 -1.6741 
(-1.025) 
0.0521 
(0.034) 
 2.7737*** 
(4.446) 
0.6079 
(0.661) 
β1,S,1 
0.3464*** 
(3.024) 
0.0124 
(0.113) 
 0.8022*** 
(2.955) 
-0.3860 
(-1.506) 
 9.0916*** 
(13.679) 
0.6070 
(0.620) 
β1,S,5 
0.2734 
(1.016) 
0.2123 
(0.828) 
 0.4904 
(0.560) 
0.9343 
(1.130) 
 -6.2839** 
(-2.500) 
-0.7180 
(-0.194) 
β1,S,22 
3.7563*** 
(6.006) 
-0.4255 
(-0.714) 
 0.3556 
(0.174) 
1.2957 
(0.673) 
 -31.4012*** 
(-6.384) 
-6.5017 
(-0.897) 
α2 
-0.2191* 
(-1.806) 
0.0867 
(0.750) 
 -0.0294 
(-0.367) 
-0.0584 
(-0.770) 
 -0.0429 
(-0.608) 
0.0356 
(0.343) 
β2,F,1 
0.1333 
(0.684) 
0.2069 
(1.114) 
 -0.0086 
(-0.090) 
-0.0050 
(-0.056) 
 0.3995* 
(1.690) 
1.4700*** 
(4.218) 
β2,F,5 
-0.4089 
(-0.870) 
-0.1842 
(-0.411) 
 0.3245 
(1.534) 
0.2850 
(1.428) 
 0.0969 
(0.222) 
-1.7692*** 
(-2.748) 
β2,F,22 
0.5380 
(0.905) 
1.0264* 
(1.811) 
 -0.5553 
(-0.985) 
0.9145* 
(1.718) 
 0.1589 
(0.238) 
0.1046 
(0.106) 
β2,S,1 
-0.0435 
(-0.282) 
0.0921 
(0.627) 
 0.1647* 
(1.683) 
-0.0035 
(-0.038) 
 0.1008 
(1.610) 
0.3759*** 
(4.074) 
β2,S,5 
0.3181 
(1.127) 
0.4671* 
(1.736) 
 0.2164 
(0.997) 
0.2008 
(0.980) 
 -0.0383 
(-0.254) 
0.4049* 
(1.822) 
β2,S,22 
-0.1826 
(-0.567) 
-0.1609 
(-0.524) 
 0.2596 
(0.695) 
-0.2853 
(-0.810) 
 -0.1901 
(-0.610) 
-0.2367 
(-0.544) 
LR 41.517*** 2.064  6.977* 1.377  269.044*** 17.155*** 
Note: The table reports the estimation results of the heterogeneous autoregressive realized volatility (HAR-RV) 
model in Equation (5). The sample period runs from February to November each year. The values in parentheses 
are the t-statistics. The row LR presents the Likelihood Ratio joint test results for the null hypotheses of β1,S,1= 
β2,S,1, β1,S,5= β2,,S,5, β1,S,22= β2,S,22 in the columns RVF concerning volatility spillovers from the spot to the futures 
market and the results testing the null hypotheses of β1,F,1= β2,F,1, β1,F,5= β2,F,5, β1,F,22= β2,F,22 in columns RVS 
concerning volatility spillovers from the futures to the spot market. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively.   
  
 
  
 
 
